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For decades, energy experts have promoted energy prospects in Northeast Asia.
Here is a rapidly growing region with an energy deficit and high energy prices adjacent to
Pacific Russia, a major potential supplier of oil, gas, and electricity.  Here is a region
where capital-rich lenders could unlock the wealth of resource-rich producers.  Yet, while
the Asian economy boomed, nothing happened.
Authors from the National Pipeline Research Society of Japan, the Hyundai
Research Center, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and East-West Institute
produced elaborate programs--the Asia-Pacific Energy Community, the Vostok Plan, the
Energy Silk Route Project, Kovyktinsk Gas Project, Trans Asian Gas Pipeline Network.2
The L. A. Melent'ev Energy Systems Institute in Irkutsk estimated multi-level, multi-
sectoral models of each program for four regions, 18 sectors, and 25 years.3  Yet, few of
these paper plans were realized.
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In the cold-war era, political differences complicated agreement on long-term
economic projects.  Then, with the onset of economic reform, competition for ownership
of Russia’s resource wealth, weak rule of law, and capital flight led to higher, not lower,
levels of political and economic risk.  In 1992, with the opening of the Russian market,
Western oil and gas producers and equipment suppliers began to seek links to Russia's
newly privatizing oil giants.  Companies which initiated projects found a chaotic
environment with fuzzy property rights and rapidly changing regulations and taxes, so
many withdrew after a few unprofitable ventures to wait until the business environment
improved, convinced that Russian policy-makers saw little role for foreign producers in
their domestic energy sector.
In the decade following economic reform, the Russian economy received a trickle
of foreign direct investment. In 1998, foreign direct investment in Russia totaled $1.5
billion according to balance of payments figures, or $3 million if one included loans
within Russian firms and their subsidiaries.  Of that modest amount, about 60 percent was
directed to Russian industry, and, within industry, only 15 percent went to the fuel and oil
sectors.4
Investment into the development of the offshore oil and gas on Sakhalin Island’s
shelf is a crucial exception.  At the beginning of 2000, two major Western consortia,
called Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2, have committed more than $1 billion to exploration
and development of Sakhalin’s energy, making direct payments of $67 million into the
local Sakhalin Development Fund.
In July 1999, Sakhalin-2 celebrated production of first oil, announcing plans to
undertake production at the rate of 90,000 barrels per day during the summer of 2000.
Their total cost of the first phase of development of the Piltun-Astokhsky field is
estimated to be $733 million,  $348 million of which is funded by loans from the EBRD,
OPIC, and the Export-Import Bank of Japan.  Both producers are seeking commitments
from potential consumers of natural gas in Asia, while the Russian government, itself, has
allocated a modest first installment of investment to an extension of the local pipeline
                                                
4  Peter Westin, "Foreign Direct Investment in Russia," Russian Economic Trends.  Vol 8, No 1, 1999, 42.4
network between Sakhalin Island and adjoining Khabarovsk territory to deliver energy to
consumers in the Russian Far East (RFE).5
Although promising, the success of energy development on the Sakhalin shelf is
by no means assured, for there are barriers on both the supply and demand sides of the
market.  Russian policy-makers, themselves, are badly divided on whether to develop
their energy sector as part of the international market.  Earlier, with world oil selling at
$10 a barrel, it seemed that only foreign multinationals could bring in the investment to
reverse declining production, but, today, with oil selling for more than $25 a barrel, there
are strong pressures from domestic producers to enforce domestic control of energy
against possible foreign participation.  At the same time, Russian domestic consumers,
whose value-subtracting enterprises depend on hidden subsidies of cheap energy, seek to
block export of energy to world markets. Thus, Russia’s energy wealth could play a
catalytic role in fostering regional growth, but, just as in other countries, there are also
strong protectionist interests that would benefit if high levels of political and economic
risk protect them from foreign competition and preserve their monopoly role in the
domestic economy.
In the pages that follow, I look closely at foreign involvement in the energy sector
of Sakhalin’s shelf, asking several questions.  How has the small energy sector of
Sakhalin managed to attract major international investment at a time when other Western
investment was fleeing from Russia?  What strategies do the operating partners use to
protect investment from expropriation, due to either administrative intervention or
“creeping expropriation” through unpredictable changes in laws, taxes, and regulations?
How are the benefits and costs of development divided between foreign investors, the
Russian Federation government, and local communities?  Then, looking ahead, I inquire:
What domestic and foreign developments will determine the directions and prospects of
these projects?  Can Sakhalin's energy sector play a decisive role in reversing the fortunes
of what will otherwise be Russia's declining periphery?  More broadly, could a network
of pipelines and ports linking energy producers in Russia with consumers in Japan,
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Korea, and China create economic links among the economically and politically
fragmented states of North East Asia?
The Risk of Expropriation
Investment on Sakhalin has gone ahead in the face of significant risk.  Investors
point to high levels of political and economic risk, corruption and illegal activity, fuzzy
property rights, weak rule of law, weak corporate governance, and unequal competitive
conditions as some of the major impediments to investment.  In the case of natural
resources, where rights of access are defined and controlled by the government, foreign
investors lament the lack of a “level playing field,” claiming that insider elites with close
relationships to government administrators gain control of resource rights and the
resulting incomes.  In the absence of a clear, enforceable framework defining ownership,
taxation, and regulation, foreign investors face a high risk of expropriation, either by
administrative intervention or by “creeping expropriation” through unpredictable changes
in laws, regulations, and taxes.
Businesses undertake many strategies to reduce the costs and risks of
expropriation, recognizing that they may be subject to “hold up” once their capital is sunk
in a host country. When a weak legal framework makes third-party enforcement of
agreements difficult, parties seek to set up implicit, self-enforcing agreements to provide
a framework for cooperation.  Agreement is possible when both partners’ benefits from
continued agreement are greater than the potential gains to either from deviation, but one
of the difficulties of self-enforcing agreements is that each party must have the means to
punish a partner who deviates from the contract.
What strategies can companies and governments use to create self-enforcing
agreements and reduce the risk of expropriation?  Multinational corporations attempt to
spread risk by involving a group of complementary firms and international banks in each
project.  A consortium can share both risk and information about the reliability of a
partner.  Reputation is a powerful mechanism for enforcing contracts, because a host
country that lives up to agreements and provides a transparent framework of business law
gains access to international capital markets on favorable terms.6
Although limited at present, production-sharing legislation in Russia is a potential
means for reducing certain sources of risk, such as the risk of arbitrary changes in
taxation.  Production sharing allows the operating company and the host government to
share the price risk of changing costs and prices on the world market.
Some mechanisms involve “posting a bond” or holding each other’s assets
hostage to guarantee good performance.  For example, revenues from energy sales may
be held in escrow, or a domestic firm may accumulate its earnings as equity in a foreign
firm in order to balance its control of the foreign firm’s assets in the home market.   In
other cases, investors may commit resources gradually so that a host-country’s short-run
incentive to expropriate will be offset by the long-run incentives to gain access to future
finance, technology, and know-how.
A self-enforcing arrangement requires that each party to an agreement at every
point in time is better off abiding by the mutual commitment than deviating from it.  In an
uncertain world where costs and benefits are impacted by unanticipated shocks it is
difficult to negotiate arrangements that will survive every contingency.  In the case of
Sakhalin, issues of fiscal federalism further complicate formal agreement.  There is
considerable evidence that territories that earn increased direct budget revenues are
penalized by losing an offsetting amount of federal transfers.
It is the federal government that is the legal owner of the shelf’s resources. In its
choices, the federal government may trade off the revenue benefits of a current project
against the interests of the domestic oil and gas industry—expressed in their lobbying and
political support-- which may want to hold an option to invest in the future.
Large capital-intensive projects are particularly difficult because capital must be
sunk before production begins to provide a flow of earnings.  Natural gas projects, which
extend across national borders and over many years, are particularly difficult, because
both producers and consumers must commit to long-term guarantees even when they face
great uncertainty as to future costs, prices, and technologies.  So, even when energy
projects offer great potential benefits, there are significant obstacles to their realization as
well.
Sakhalin's Energy Sector7
A case study of development of Sakhalin’s shelf provides a test of attempts to
build a framework for investment when the domestic framework for contract enforcement
is weak.  In September 1999, I visited Sakhalin to interview executives of Western
energy firms, subcontractors, local government officials, and academic specialists.  I
asked what strategies the firms and policy-makers used to establish agreement, resolve
disputes, and minimize the risk of outright or creeping expropriation and what benefits
each party expected to receive from the projects.
Before reform, Sakhalin Island was a heavily subsidized military outpost, but,
after reform, few workers could support themselves in the region’s fishing, farming, and
forestry. Civilian employment fell from 395,000 to 254,000.  Population fled to more
prosperous regions, and local officials had enormous incentives to stem the decline on
Russia’s periphery. Development of oil and gas promised to serve as a catalyst,
generating know-how and employment, and reducing energy costs for the whole region.
[Insert Table: Sakhalin Population and Employment]
The oil and gas industry is Sakhalin's oldest.  When native people told of a "black
lake of death," Russian surveyors in the 1890s found surface deposits of oil in northern
Sakhalin. The first well was drilled in 1911.  The first oil field with 20 derricks was
established at Okha in 1928.  Soon, a railroad and pipeline connected Okha to the coast.
Sakhalin produced about 2.4 million tons of oil per year from 1965 until the late 1980s.
Today, nineteen of these on-shore fields are still in operation, although most are nearing
the end of their commercial life.
After the oil shock of the early 1970s, the Soviet Union agreed with an
international consortium to undertake exploration of offshore sites.  Exploratory work
began in 1976 with a Japanese consortium, Sodeco.  Under terms of the agreement, Japan
advanced credits of  $176 million to be repaid only if sufficient fuel was found and the
Russian side deemed it profitable.  In this case, Japan was to receive half of the output.
During the 1976-1982 period, the project, Sakhalin-1, discovered two fields, Chaivo and
Odoptu, but neither field was deemed profitable at the lower fuel prices prevailing in the
1980s.
Subsequently, several additional offshore fields were discovered, including
Piltun-Astokhsky, Lunsky, and Arkutun-Dagi.  In 1988, the Russian government
authorized the Ministry of Oil and Gas to develop the first two of these, but the lack of
experience of the domestic industry in an Arctic offshore environment meant that foreign
participation would be required.
  In May 1991, Russia invited competitive international bidding for a feasibility
study of two large deposits in northeastern Sakhalin, Lunsky and Piltun-Astokhsky.8
After intense competition between six consortia, a group that included Marathon Oil,
McDermott, and Mitsui was chosen to undertake exploration, and a holding company,
Sakhalin Energy Development Company was established.  Later, Royal Dutch Shell and
Mitsubishi joined the group and, subsequently, McDermott withdrew.
The resource stocks that have attracted such intense interest are large, but not
giant.  They are located in North East Asia, a region of energy deficit, although
Sakhalin's offshore environment presents Arctic conditions, violent storms, and risk of
earthquakes.  A recent publication by the Sakhalin Administration estimates total
recoverable reserves of oil, gas, and condensate at 99.6 mil tons of oil equivalent onshore
and 791 mil tons on the Sakhalin shelf.6    This is more than half the size of reserves in
Alaska's Prudhoe Bay.  However, it appears that three-quarters or more of reserves are
natural gas, consumption of which will require either an expensive pipeline network or
facilities to process and transport liquefied natural gas (LNG).  A table in the appendix
provides a conservative itemization of reserves by individual field, which shows that
Pilton-Astokhsky and Odoptu represent the primary stocks of oil and condensate (104
and 70 mil. tons respectively), while Chaivo and Lunsky are primarily gas fields (147.5
and 350 bcm.)
7  With much of the region still unexplored, recoverable reserves may
prove considerably larger.
[Insert Table: Sakhalin Shelf Projects]
The four large fields under current development are:
• Odoptu - 15-20 kilometers offshore, 22-40 meters depth.  Oil is found at 1200-2000
meters deep in 13 layers.
• Chaivo - 12-15 kilometers offshore, 18-32 meters depth.  Oil is found at 110-2800
meters deep in 10 layers.
• Lunsky - 112-15 kilometers offshore, 40-50 meters depth, 5 blocks.
• Piltun-Astokhsky - 12-15 kilometers offshore, 26-33 meters depth.  Oil is found in 14
layers.
The Russian Partners
The main Russian partners in all prospective projects are Rosneft and
Sakhalinmorneftegas (SMNG).  A branch of SMNG, SMNG-shelf, participates separately
as a partner in Sakhalin-1.  Although most of the Russian oil industry has been privatized
                                                
6  Ibid., p. 123.
7 Exploration drilling indicated that the Odoptu reserves were less promising than originally expected.9
into about eight vertically integrated closed joint stock companies, Rosneft and SMNG
operate as separate, mainly state-owned corporations.
Rosneft is a state oil holding company that controls a miscellaneous assortment of
assets that were not integrated into the original dozen vertically integrated closed joint
stock companies formed after the break-up of the former Soviet Union.  Although
Rosneft lost its main production subsidiary, Noyabrskneftegaz, to Sibneft in 1995, it
serves as the federal government's exclusive exporter of the Federation share in all oil
sector production-sharing contracts and runs a vast sales network for refined products.  It
controls the Komsomolsk-na-Amure oil refinery in Khabarovsk territory, which receives
Sakhalin crude oil by pipeline and processes it, exporting half of these products to the
Pacific market.  Officials of the Federation government have announced conflicting plans
either to sell the state share of Rosneft or to establish a national oil company in the future.
In 1998, low oil prices made Rosneft unprofitable, so it was unable to contribute to
development costs of Sakhalin-1, but its financial balance has improved with current high
prices for oil.
  Sakhalinmorneftegaz is a medium-sized oil producer, formed on the basis of a
former government production association.  It currently produces about 1.49 million tons
of oil and 1.78 billion cubic meters of gas annually, delivering both to the Russian market
by two pipelines.  Two-thirds of its oil production is exported to the world market.  It was
partially privatized in 1994, when an 18.36 percent stake was sold at a voucher auction
and another 0.31 percent of the company's charter capital was sold at a cash auction.  In
1995, under a presidential decree, it was amalgamated with Rosneft, which now holds a
51 percent stake in it.  In early 1997, SMNG, Rosneft, and ABN-AMRO bank signed an
agreement under which the bank would provide $8 billion of a total of $13 billion in
capital costs over the lifetime of the Sakhalin-1 project.8  The Russian partners have also
received credits from US OPIC, Japan's export bank, and the EBRD.
Recently, new state-owned corporations have appeared as Russian bureaucracies
vied for control and cash flow rights to oil projects.  The Sakhalin regional government
set up Sakhalin Oil Company (SOC), which, they argued, should receive a percentage
share of ownership in each project without cost. In 1999, Rosneft-SMNG did, in fact,
sign over a 10 percent stake in the Kirinsky block to a joint venture with SOC, named
Vostok-Shelf.
  This spring, a new subsidiary of Rosneft was created, AO Dalneftegas, to
represent Russian regional interests in gas development.  Fifty-one percent of its shares
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went to Rosneft and its subsidiary, Sakhalinmorneftegas.  The other 49 percent were
divided between Rosgasifikatsiya (the gas pipeline contractor) and the regional
governments of Khabarovsk, Primore, and Sakhalin, the primary domestic demanders of
natural gas.  The agreement stipulates that the Rosneft and SMNG shares of gas
production must be delivered to the domestic market--on what terms, it is not clear.  The
three regional governments also organized a state pipeline company, Daltrans, to
construct pipeline capacity between Sakhalin and the mainland, funding it initially with a
federal allocation of 97.5 million rubles ($3.4 million).
 
Current and Future Projects
Western participants in the first three offshore projects are major international oil
companies together with Sodeco, a Japanese consortium organized around Japan's
national oil company.
Sakhalin-1 brings together Exxon Neftegas (30 percent), Sodeco (30 percent),
Rosneft-SMNG (17 percent) and SMNG-shelf (23 percent) in a project to develop
Chaivo, Odoptu, and Arkutun-Dagi fields.  A production sharing agreement was signed
in 1995, and work has been underway since 1996.  However, the project is still in the
exploration phase, meaning that the partners have yet to determine commercial
feasibility.  After completing 3D seismic surveys and appraisal drilling, Exxon found
potential commercial reserves of gas rather than oil, but development of natural gas
would require long-term agreements with consumers before a project could be funded.
Exxon has contracted for a pipeline feasibility study from Japanese Sakhalin
Pipeline Study Consortium, including Japex, Marubeni, and Itochu. This group is to
investigate both a land route to Northeast China and an underwater pipeline to Hokkaido.
Exxon cancelled exploration drilling during the summer season of 1999 when
they failed to reach agreement with the Russian environmental agency, Goskomekologia,
about the treatment of drilling mud and cuttings, but local officials announced that the
issue has been resolved in April 2000.
9
The Sakhalin-2 consortium was luckier in finding commercial quantities of oil.
In July 1999, they began production of early oil under a production sharing agreement.
The operating company, Sakhalin Energy Investment Company, (SEIC) brings together
Marathon (37.5 percent), Mitsui (25 percent), Mitsubishi (12.5), and Shell (25 percent) in
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developing the Piltun-Astokhsky, and Lunsky fields.  The project began slowly in 1991
and accelerated after signing of a production sharing agreement in 1994.  SEIC proposed
a phased development of the Piltun-Astokhskoye field starting with Astokhskoye.10  In
1999, production started at SEIC's Vityaz complex, which consists of the Molikpaq
offshore drilling rig and an adjoining offshore oil storage tanker from which oil transport
tankers offload product for transport to the market.  In September, the first tanker of oil
was shipped to Korea, and the company announced plans to undertake production during
2000, at a rate of 90,000 bpd.
Sakhalin-2 has taken the lead in the proposed construction of a natural gas
pipeline to the south of Sakhalin, intending to build a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant
with an eventual capacity of 8.9 million tons per year.   If this option were implemented,
LNG would be shipped to electric power utilities in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and
coastal China.
In the case of LNG, too, there are constraints from both the investment and
demand sides.  Funding of an LNG plant at a port site in south Sakhalin would require a
guarantee of long-term purchase commitments at a price sufficient to justify investment.
Until Japan enjoys renewed growth, it is unlikely to be interested in committing to
additional purchases of LNG.  In southern China, where capacity to handle LNG is under
construction, Sakhalin gas would compete with Southeast Asian suppliers, such as
Indonesia. So, in the near term, only South Korea appears likely to commit to a rapid
increase in consumption of LNG.
    The Sakhalin-3 tender involves Pegastar, owned by Mobil-Exxon and Texaco, in
the Kirinsky field and Exxon-Mobil, separately, in the Ayashsky and East-Odoptinsky
fields.  Both projects are joint with Rosneft-SMNG.  The Kirinsky field, with an
estimated 450 million tons of oil, 970 billion cubic meters of gas, and 62 million tons of
condensate has received authorization for production sharing, but the Ayashsky and East
Odoptinsky fields, with 114 million tons of oil and 513 billion cubic meters of gas, are
still pending.
Sakhalin-4, a collection of offshore and onshore fields licensed to Rosneft-
SMNG, was originally to be developed jointly with Arco.  Arco withdrew this spring
when the project failed to receive authorization for production sharing.  Rosneft-SMNG
intends to finance exploration during the summer of 2000 amid speculation that Arco’s
new parent company, British Petroleum, might have renewed interest in the project.
                                                
10  Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd.  Development Plan for Phased Development of Piltun-
Astokhskoye Field.  (Processed draft.)12
Sakhalin-5 would tentatively involve British Petroleum and Sakhalin-6, Pegastar, both
joint with Rosneft-SMNG.
Taxation and the Legal Framework for Use of Natural Resources
Western interest in the Russian energy sector was delayed by the need to put in
place the legal structure for production sharing agreements similar to those used in most
other countries.  Production sharing legislation was intended to simplify the complex and
changing tax structure that businesses faced and to divide project risk between the
operating companies and Russian government.   The following table provides a list of the
taxes that a conventional resource project in Russia could expect to pay in the absence of
a production sharing agreement.
11  They would pay royalties (6-20%), geology fund
payments (10%), VAT (20%), excises (approx. 14%), and sales tax (4%) on production
or sales; profit tax (30%) on profits; payments to pension fund (28%), state employment
fund (2%), social insurance (5.4%), medical insurance (3.6%), education fund (1%),
militia fund (2%), and transport fund (1%) on wages.  On imports there would be
customs duty, excise, VAT, and customs clearance.  Then there would be assets tax (2%
of assets), land use payments, and, in the case of oil, payments for loss of fish, and fines,
if applicable.  The firm would withhold 12-35% of employee wages for income tax.
[Insert Table:  Tax Calculation]
Production Sharing Agreements simplify the legal framework.  The original
Russian Federation Law on Production Sharing Agreements, signed in 1995, allowed the
Federation government to enter into an agreement with an investor granting the investor
exclusive rights to prospect for and extract mineral raw materials from a designated
site.12  A license was to be issued jointly by the Federal Agency for State Mineral
Resource Management and the territorial administration.  However, international
contracts were subject to parliamentary approval, and there were strict domestic content
conditions.  Moreover, the Russian side reserved the right to make unilateral changes in
arrangements in response to changes in world markets.  There were few safeguards for
the foreign investor in the event of a dispute.  The Production Sharing Law explicitly
exempted the investors, their contractors, and subcontractors from taxes, fees, excises,
and other obligatory payments except for profits tax, royalty payments, bonuses,
                                                
11 Tax estimates provided by Sakhalin government authorities, September 1999.
12  Russian Federation Law No 224-FL on Production Sharing Agreements, Moscow, 30 December '95;
Passed by the State Duma on 6 December, approved by the Federation Council on 19 December '95 (Cited
in Rossiiskiya Gazeta, 11 January '96, 3-4.13
exploration payments (levied on the user of subsoil resources), land use payments, and
insurance coverage of Russian employees.
A number of enabling laws and regulations followed.13  In addition, the Federal
Duma passed the Law on the List of Fields Eligible for Development under Production
Sharing Terms, limiting the number of projects that would be eligible for PSA.  The
Duma placed a cap of 30 percent on the share of sites that could be developed under PSA
in any individual region.  For "strategic resources" (such as the shelf) the ceiling was 10
percent.  Passage of Part I of a new Tax Code in January 1999 further simplified tax
accounting and provided some guarantees against ex post taxes.
Russian tendering of resource stocks is based on a set of model Production
Sharing Agreements.  Tenders for offshore fields are conducted by the Committee on
Geology and Sub-Soil Resources of the Russian Federation (Goskomnedra) and the
Sakhalin Administration after authorization by a Federation decree.  For each project, a
tender committee of federal and territorial officials considers the bids.  Interested firms
receive a copy of a model Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) and submit sealed bids
by a specified deadline.  Submitted bids must include a minimum guaranteed
commitment of exploration activity for each of the first five years as well as any
proposed changes to the PSA.
The PSA for Sakhalin-4 is an example.  It includes a royalty of 8 percent on
production and profit tax of 35 percent.14  There is a cost recovery limit of 80 percent.
Production shares depend on the company's accounting internal rate of return after
payment of profit taxes.  At a rate of return lower than 22 percent, the split is 70 percent
to the company, 30 percent to the Russian Federation.  For rates of return 22-26 percent,
there is a 60-40 split.  Above that point, the production split changes by 10 percent for
every 2 percent increase in rate of return.  Based on long-run projections of production
and cost, the model PSA provides a company-Federation division of 55-45.
The Sakhalin-1, -2, and -3 contracts additionally provide bonus payments to the
Federation government upon reaching certain milestones, such as initial signing and the
start of production.  Under the PSAs, each consortium contributes to the Sakhalin
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Development Fund after a commercial discovery is announced and annually for 5 years
after that.
Negotiations between federal authorities and the territorial government determine
the division of payments between the Federation and territorial governments.  The
Federation Treaty and Federation Law on Sub-Soil Resources specify a division of the
royalties giving the federal government 40 percent, territory 30 percent, and local
government 30 percent.  Under an agreement negotiated between the Sakhalin
administration and the federal government, Sakhalin is to receive the following income
shares:15
Regional Share  Percentage
Sakhalin Development Fund    100
Royalties    50
Bonuses    60
Profit oil    50
Out of the 32% profits tax on investor income, Sakhalin receives 22%.
The Sakhalin Energy Investment Company's Development Plan for the Piltun-
Astokhskoye Field provides the following estimates of Russian government revenues for
Phase I of the project (prior to development of natural gas reserves.)  They project
Russian government income of $2.7 billion dollars, including $470 million received by
2005.
Estimated Russian Income      Total Region
(Without discounting) ($ Mil) ($ Mil)
• Royalties    417. 208.5
• Profit Shares 1137.5 568.8
• Sakhalin Development Fund  100. 100.
• Exploration Reimbursement  160.
• Bonuses                30.    18.
• Profit Tax  854.9   581.3
• TOTAL RUSSIAN INCOME            2699.3 1476.6
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• CUMULATIVE REVENUE TO 2005     470.
Galina Pavlova, Head of the Department on Development of Mineral Resources
of the Sakhalin Shelf said that she expects the Sakhalin-2 project to generate government
revenue of about $500 million by 2005.16
The financial projections of Pegastar for the South Kirensky portion of
Sakhalin-3 are similarly optimistic.17  If South Kirensky contains a recoverable reserve
of 450 million tons of oil plus 720 billion m
3 of gas, then the Russian government would
receive:
Before production:
• PSA signature bonus $25 million
• Exploration bonus     10 million
• Discovery bonus     5 million
• Sakhalin Development Fund        100 million
During peak production, the Russian government would receive about $1 billion per year
from royalties, taxes, and sale of profit oil.  This would total $20 billion over the life of
the project (without discounting).
Although, in theory, introduction of Production Sharing Agreements should
represent a breakthrough, in practice, their implementation remains chaotic.  The PSA
legislation contradicts many existing laws, and it will take considerable time before new
legislation is put in place that recognizes the exceptions and provides a framework of
conforming decrees, regulations, and instructions.  In the meantime, each ambiguity
creates an opportunity to block or delay progress in an environment in which there is still
considerable opposition to foreign participation in Russia's resource sectors.
Sakhalin Island; A Test Case
How has the small energy sector of Sakhalin managed, in 1999, to become the
second-largest recipient of foreign investment in Russia after Moscow?  In a number of
respects, Sakhalin differs from other resource-rich regions.  Its location on Russia’s
periphery, but only 60 kilometers from Japan, raises strategic concerns in Moscow.
Moreover, the rapid fall of population from 714,000 to 608,000 between 1990 and 1998
signaled the consequences of Moscow’s inability to provide its previous rate of subsidy.
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(A recent source refers to a decline from 607,000 to 526,000, suggesting that there are
still about 80,000 people in the military or other federal security agencies whose support
involves direct federal subsidies.)
18  So, policy-makers are concerned with the economic
health of Russia’s Pacific gateway, recognizing that farming, logging, and fishing could
support no more than a small share of existing population.
Moreover, Sakhalin’s remoteness from Moscow weakened the interest of
competing domestic oil and gas interests in blocking foreign involvement in immediate
development.  The domestic oil industry faced severe capital constraints.  Investment in
the sector was inadequate even to maintain existing wells and pipelines, so oil production
was falling.  The natural gas resources of the shelf were separate and distant from
Gasprom’s network of pipelines linking West Siberia to Europe, and new Gasprom
investments largely were directed toward forging links with Western European
customers.
There were technological reasons, as well, favoring involvement of Western
companies with experience in offshore development in difficult environments such as
Alaska and the North Sea.  Russian domestic firms had little such experience. Domestic
equipment available to them had many shortcomings.  Drilling engineers mentioned large
differences between Russian and Western drill bits, drilling fluids, and cement. Russian
drill bits were said to last only one-fourth to one-fifth as long as Western equipment,
lengthening the drilling process and risking damage to the reservoir.  (Russian and
Western firms, alike, face lengthy governmental certification processes before they can
gain permission to use Western equipment in Russia.)
An empirical comparison of Russian and Western oil extraction shows that the
Russian industry experienced rapidly declining yields and short reservoir life compared
with similar reservoirs in the West.  James Smith estimated that Russian producers lost
approximately 40 percent of the total economic value of resource stocks compared with
similar fields in the West.
19  So, policy makers could expect foreign development to
provide a substantially larger flow of rents to the government budget, and they expected,
through strict domestic content rules, to generate a substantial upgrading of the
technology of domestic oil equipment and production as well.  The local producing firms
expected to gain new skills and to gain further employment with Western firms as the
local on-shore fields were depleted.
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Environmental concerns favored Western involvement as well.  In the past,
Russia’s oil industry had demonstrated a weak environmental record.  In an interview
conducted by editors of Petroleum Economist in 1996, senior executives of
Rosneftegazstroy, Russia’s premier oil and gas contractor, explained:
“…the majority of the pipeline construction projects, except for the trunk ones,
did not comply with, or meet, world standards…No provision was made in the
projects for monitoring pipeline conditions during operations…The inappropriate
use of corrosion inhibitors and electrochemical protection units has resulted in
high corrosion rates in pipelines…The lack of on-line pipeline diagnostics has
meant it has been difficult to detect damage and so prevent leakage of gas, oil and
oil products.
“As a result, the number of registered accidents at pipelines runs to thousands a
year.  The number of ‘insignificant’ leaks exceeded 40,000/year…
“Instead of the design service life of 15 to 20 years, many in-field
pipelines become unserviceable, due to internal corrosion and erosion, within as
little as two to five years.”
20
 (In September 1999, I talked with the head of an environmental-remediation firm who
reported that, in Komi, en route to inspect a major oil spill, he counted 16 other pipeline
leaks in the space of 30 kilometers.)
21
The Russian fisheries industry is concerned with the risk to their important fishery
in the Sea of Okhotsk.  Local policy-makers and scientists reversed their traditional
opposition to energy development only after on-site visits to Alaskan offshore fields,
such as Cook Inlet, where strict environmental monitoring allows offshore production to
co-exist with a rich fisheries resource.  They were willing to support offshore energy only
if similarly strict safeguards were maintained.
The Interest of Western Firms
Large multinational energy companies assume that they must maintain a presence
in any country that is both a major producer and a major market for energy, as Russia is.
(Perhaps this practice helps explain the low valuation of energy assets on capital
markets.)
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Nevertheless, energy executives found the Russian environment uniquely
difficult.  In industrialized countries, they argued, the oil producer finds strong physical
and institutional infrastructure, a strong network of suppliers and services, developed
financial markets and an effective legal framework.  But there are also many competitors
in such markets.
In developing countries, there is little local infrastructure or industrial support, a
weak capital market, and an incomplete legal framework.  But, in these markets, policy
makers are open to modernization and willing to construct physical and institutional
infrastructure to foster development.  Here, the formation of strong relationships can
create a relatively stable business environment for the firm and provide some barriers to
competition.
The Russian environment represents a third case in which there is a large and
politically powerful domestic oil and gas industry that has incentives to block foreign
competition.  There is also a large body of administrative regulation and practice, most of
which is unproductive in a modern, competitive business environment.  New legislation,
reflecting world practice, contradicts past administrative law.  When the two legal
frameworks conflict, administrators usually follow past administrative practice.
In spite of these difficulties, Western firms were attracted to Sakhalin’s location
because they could have direct access to the Pacific market without facing potential hold
up by Transneft, the Russian government pipeline monopoly.  They expected production
sharing legislation to establish a secure framework of taxation, eliminating some of the
opportunities for creeping expropriation of potential rents.  On this score, they have been
disappointed.
Western firms have the ability to impose some potential penalties (or to withhold
some benefits) in the face of expropriation.  They can easily transfer their centralized
technologies, skilled personnel, and support services to numerous other projects around
the world.  The potential loss of employment would be concentrated on skilled industrial
workers and manufacturing capacities, which bore the sharpest drop in demand after
economic reform.  Unlike domestic plants, offshore production facilities have some
limited physical mobility.  If production were terminated, Sakhalin Energy Investment
Company could physically remove their oil storage facility, the tanker, Okha, and even
their oil-drilling platform, the Molipaq, which was towed to the Pacific from
Newfoundland.19
Implementation Issues
Interviews with oil company executives, subcontractors, and officials in the
government administration in September 1999 brought up frequent examples of what
might be called "hold-up" problems.  However, companies anticipated many of these
problems and were prepared to deal with them—albeit at a considerable cost.  In some
ways, the Sakhalin environment is like a "tragedy of the commons," with each regulatory
agency trying to hold up the project for a piece of the rent.  One executive of a company
drilling an exploratory well listed 32 permits and licenses that were required before
drilling could start.  "None of these permits it trivial," he said.  "Each requires reports,
fees, and negotiations.  Each agency can shut down everything."  Often, the problem was
competition between three or four agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, which had
conflicting requirements.  On environmental issues, Goskomekologiya, the
environmental agency, the Committee for Sanitary-Epidemiological Oversight, and the
Oblast Shelf Department often have three conflicting views.  There are cases in which
federal authorities at the center overrule both the territorial branch of the same federal
agency and Sakhalin's own regulatory agency.  For example, both the local branch of the
Ministry for Emergency Situations and the Coast Guard Agency of the Ministry of
Transport have been involved in developing a system for oil spill response, so they
objected when federal authorities came in insisting on a totally new, centrally directed
program.
Clearly, there is a necessary role for environmental, health, and safety regulation,
however, on Sakhalin, more than 40 percent of the civilian employed population is in
government service.  The Director of Environmental Programs for one project estimated
the annual extra costs of getting approvals and permits at approximately $500,000.
However, this is a relatively minor impediment compared with other sources of
uncertainty.   The oil companies simply accept that a large part of the potential resource
rents will be eaten up by regulation, so they make some effort to direct these overhead
expenditures toward activities that will benefit the community, such as enhancement of
fisheries stocks, resource-related biological research, and social welfare programs in the
community. However, one company executive estimated that ninety-five percent of the
regulatory delays were due, not to local, but to federal authorities.
Some of the interventions by federal agencies threaten the foundations of the
production sharing legislation.  Although the 1995 production sharing law specifically
exempts project equipment from the Russian value added tax, the Customs Authority20
levied VAT on all equipment imports.  By mid-1999, more than $80 million in illegal
VAT had been collected.  The Tax Authority promised that investors would be allowed to
add VAT to the eventual capital cost of the project before calculating profits, but this
capture of taxes up-front before the projects produced any income sabotaged the timing
of bonuses and payments to the Sakhalin administration.   Payments to the Sakhalin
Development Fund were set up to guarantee that the territorial government would enjoy a
steady flow of revenue of at least $20 million per year for the life of the project.  Now,
there would be a delay before Sakhalin would eventually share in profits.  Then, in March
2000, the federal government announced that Customs would no longer charge value-
added tax on equipment imports.
Collapse of the Russian banking system in August 1998, disrupted project
accounts.  Many foreign companies lost the balances in their local hard currency
accounts.  One company, which had just transferred $10 million in payments into a
Russian bank, lost the full amount when the bank went bankrupt.
In 1999, the State Environmental Agency issued a regulation requiring that all
companies barge their drilling fluid to shore and deposit in a waste disposal site.  "The
drilling fluid contains salt water and bentonite," one engineer explained.  "This is
normally discharged at sea… But dumping salt water on land is certainly harmful.  We
will prepare a safe, well-designed disposal pit, but this will double our direct costs of
drilling and raise the total project costs about 10 percent."  Another engineer alleged,
"One project paid SMNG to barge their drilling mud away, so SMNG barged it to a
different location and dumped it in the sea."  Exxon, which had two drilling rigs waiting,
cancelled exploratory drilling in 1999.  This spring, after lengthy discussion with an
expert commission named by the environmental agency, it appears that drilling will be
able to proceed.
On September 21, 1999, the tanker, Seamaster, loaded the first 81,000 tons of
Sakhalin oil to transport to Korea.  However, before they could set out, the Far Eastern
Directorate of the Customs Authority issued a letter ruling that, since SEIC was not a
joint venture, it did not have the authority to export oil.  Again, the Customs ruling was
directly contradicted by production sharing legislation, which guarantees the right to
export product.  Sakhalin Energy Investment Company was ultimately able to export its21
oil, but the possibility that export rights could be blocked in contradiction to PSA
legislation remained a concern.
Then, a week later, while SEIC president Alan Grant was meeting with
consortium members in Houston, both lines on the oil storage tanker, Okha, broke loose
at midnight in moderate seas.  Automatic sensors shut down the oil flow and separated
the oil delivery hose from the tanker.  According to SEIC, oil spill response teams began
working immediately, collecting about a barrel of the approximately two and one-half
barrels of oil that escaped.  Since no further oil could be found, calls for additional spill
response resources were cancelled.  Nevertheless, a week later the State Ecological
Committee ruled that three and one-half tons of oil had been spilled, imposing a hefty
fine on SEIC.
The strategy that SEIC uses is to try to assure that the government, and especially
the territorial government, derives a substantial, predictable income from the project in
every period beginning well before the project itself generates a flow of income.  The
implicit possibility of withdrawal comes up each time a serious problem arises.  The
withdrawal of Arco from Sakhalin-4 in the winter of 2000, combined with a slowdown in
exploration by the other companies, led the Russian government to announce in March
that they would no longer charge value added taxes on equipment imports.
Ownership Issues
Resource projects are considerably more complicated when there is joint foreign-
Russian ownership.  Rosneft-SMNG and SMNG, which are obligatory partners in most
current projects, have claimed they were not able to contribute to project costs.
Difficulties sometimes arose when SMNG wanted to function as project subcontractor,
receiving payment from Exxon.  Such a dual role makes it difficult to enforce cost and
quality constraints on work, particularly when the PSA mandates high local content.
A future ownership issue is the request by the Sakhalin Shelf Development
Department that their closed joint stock company, called Sakhalin Oil Company, should
be given a 5 percent ownership share, deducted from the foreign partner's ownership22
share, although SOC would not contribute to the cost of investment.  SOC expects to
market the territory's profit share as well.
22
The Market for Sakhalin’s Energy
Sakhalin’s oil and gas condensate can find a ready market in the Pacific without
influencing world price.  At about 2 million tons per year, RFE total annual production is
less than one percent of Japanese total consumption of 255 million tons.  The main
barriers to oil export are domestic taxes and regulations.  Export taxes on oil depending
on the level of world price.  At a price of $24 per barrel, export tax is 20 ecu per ton.
Export regulations restrict the share of refined products that may be exported.  In the fall
of 1999, refiners were required to sell most of their output on the domestic market at low,
internal prices.  The RFE fishing fleet was required to purchase fuel offshore at world
price.
At 894.6 million tons, total Asian consumption of oil products accounted for
about one-fourth of world demand (roughly equal to US total consumption).  Over the
next decade, production of oil and condensate on Sakhalin is projected to rise from 2
million tons to 8.5 million tons in 2005 and 16.2 million tons in 2010, bringing total RFE
production (including Sakha) to about 18 million tons in 2010, still less than 2 percent of
total Asian consumption.
The design of successful natural gas projects will be much more difficult.  Small
and large LNG projects have roughly similar average costs, but the average costs of
supplying pipeline gas fall sharply as the size of the project increases.  The largest single
element in cost is the cost of the pipeline itself.  The volume of gas moved through a pipe
is proportional to the pipe’s cross-section.  However, the amount of steel going into the
pipe (as well as the land area the pipeline occupies) depends on the pipe’s circumference,
which is proportional to the square root of the cross-sectional area.  So, the average cost
of pipeline gas falls rapidly until production rates equal about 20.5 billion cubic meters
per year.  In order to gain potential economies of scale, a natural gas pipeline from
Sakhalin would need to be more than 10 times larger than the current pipeline delivering
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natural gas to Khabarovsk, built in 1942.  Moreover, to supply this rate of output for 25
years, a natural gas reservoir would need to have about 800 billion cubic meters of gas.
While the natural gas resources of the Sakhalin shelf are ample in total to justify
construction of a pipeline, the Kirinsky field is the only single reservoir that is believed to
be large enough by itself to assure an adequate long run supply to the Northeast Asian
market.
There are also significant constraints on the demand side.  Most natural gas
consumption in Asia takes the form of LNG.  In 1998, the largest Asian importers of
LNG were Japan (69.5 billion cubic meters) and South Korea (15.6 billion cubic meters).
China supplied most of its own natural gas consumption of 19.3 billion cubic meters.
[Insert Oil Production and Consumption in Asia]
[Insert Natural Gas Production and Consumption in Asia]
Before they will invest in natural gas projects, capital markets require firm, long-
term contracts, supported by a strong legal framework.  In industrial economies,
construction of a pipeline requires legal rights of eminent domain, giving the energy
producer a right of way to transport gas from a field to the consumer.
Where are the markets for Sakhalin's natural gas?  Located just 60
kilometers from Hokkaido, Japan, Sakhalin is well situated in Northeast Asia, an energy
deficit region enjoying impressive rates of economic growth.  Its closest neighbor, Japan,
pays the highest energy prices of any industrial country, although, with current low rates
of growth, Japan has weak incentives to seek new energy sources.  In contrast, China's
growth has exceeded 9 percent per year for the past decade.  It pays heavy environmental
costs for the high share of coal in its current energy balance.  With natural gas accounting
for less than 2 percent of total energy consumption, China's has strong economic and
environmental reasons to increase the share of gas in its expanding consumption of
energy.  South Korea, too, seems to be returning to a rapid growth track after the Asian
financial crisis.  Its focus on production of heavy industrial products means that several
of its industries are energy-intensive.  In the past, Korea has tried to foster growth by
providing industry with access to low cost energy, so it is particularly well prepared to
make use of Russia's natural gas.24
The Russian Far East economy, itself, is a potential market for energy.  In the
Soviet era, when the relative prices of energy products were one-tenth or less of world
prices, the region was a heavy consumer of energy for metallurgy, military machine
building, fishing, and timber.  Producers faced high fixed costs for district heating in a
severe climate.  Today, the region's industries seek access to energy on heavily
subsidized terms, but they are unable or unwilling to cover its costs.  Their presence
increases the likelihood that Russia would have incentives to expropriate all or part of the
production after the fixed capital was in place, contributing to the risk that investors
foresee.
Sakhalin's natural gas could flow to one or more of these potential demanders, but
there are barriers to be overcome in each case.  In the case of Japan, Hikaru Yamada and
Arlon Tussing argue that the most serious obstacle to introduction of piped gas (or even
expanded use of LNG) is Japan's lack of an internal gas transmission and distribution
network together with the high level of stranded costs that their existing energy utilities
would bear if more efficient, lower cost energy suppliers were to emerge.
23  Currently,
they claim, Japan is at a serious, competitive handicap, with LNG imported at 20 widely
dispersed and unconnected terminals. A network of open-access gas pipelines could link
the LNG import terminals with one another and with industrial and population centers.
Without such links, Japan lacks the flexibility to shift supply from high-value district
heating to interruptible industrial uses.  With such flexibility, Japan might lower its
energy costs to half of present levels.
Between 1989 and 1997, the Mitsubishi Research Institute organized the National
Pipeline Research Society of Japan to study the feasibility of a pipeline system.  The
society, whose corporate members included Japan's main gas and electric companies and
energy equipment manufacturers, drafted the design of a major gas trunk line system for
Japan.  This plan could serve as a blue print, allowing Japan to improve its gas
transmission system.  Without transmission infrastructure, Japan will have difficulty
profiting from access to Sakhalin's natural gas.
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Accessing the Chinese market presents slightly different problems.  China's
energy balance is still heavily influenced by Chinese central plans and by the policies of
China's energy monopolies, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China
Petroleum Corporation (Sinopec), China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC), and
(recently) China National Star Petroleum Corp (CNSPC).  CNPC , with 1.5 million
employees, produces 90 % of China's oil and gas.  It has been attempting to cut its costs
and has signed dozens of onshore oil contracts with foreign partners.  Sinopec, the
flagship of China's petroleum industry, has been upgrading its existing refineries and
petrochemical plants, but joint ventures with foreign partners have moved forward
slowly.
Currently, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji is promoting a program to import LNG into
Southern China.  Construction has started on a 3 million ton per year import terminal in
Guangdong that will link the cities of Shenzen, Dougguan, and Guangzhou by a 400 km
pipeline.  Sakhalin governor Igor Farkhudinov and his staff visited Southern China in the
fall of 1999 to promote future sales.  Royal Dutch Shell, a partner in Sakhalin-2, is
expected to play a lead role in finding markets for Sakhalin's LNG.
Meanwhile, Sakhalin-1 is focusing on the potential of pipeline gas, looking at the
options of a pipeline from the south of Sakhalin to Hokkaido or a line to the Russian
mainland and, from there, to Northeastern China and/ or South Korea.  South Korea is
clearly the country in the best position to make use of natural gas in the short-run.  It
already has a natural gas grid with two loops--one surrounding Seoul and the other in
Southeastern Korea.
24  Although Korea's industry is undergoing major restructuring in
the wake of the Asian financial crisis, its rapid economic growth and specialization in
relatively energy-intensive industries makes it a strong potential customer for Sakhalin.
For all of the major customers in Asia, Japan, China, and South Korea, Sakhalin's natural
gas could be supplied sooner and at lower cost than alternative sources from Irkutsk
(including Kovytinsk), the Vilyusk Basin of Sakha, or the Sobinsk field in Krasnoyarsk.
If strong institutional infrastructure were in place to support long-run international
energy contracts, then Russian producers and Asian consumers could enjoy major
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benefits from access to low cost energy.  Northeast Asia could enjoy something of an
energy boom.  However, until the legal framework is strengthened, these projects may
remain pipe dreams.
Prospects for the Domestic Market
If prospects for RFE natural gas depend on firm long-term contracts, then
prospective domestic demand complicates, rather than resolves, future market conditions.
For, currently, Sakhalinmorneftegas delivers natural gas to power stations, municipal,
industrial, and government installations at prices that are well below its costs.  In July
1999, net price equaled approximately $7 to $8 per thousand cubic meters, net of VAT
and excise taxes collected at the rate of 24 rubles per dollar of revenue.
25  (This is
equivalent to less than $.20 per million cubic feet, or less than half of cost.) Mikhail
Korchemkin estimates that about two-thirds of natural gas consumer’s pay for their gas,
the remaining one-third accumulates arrears, which, after the fact, turn out to be an in-
kind subsidy.
26  (In the case of oil, Rosneft compensates SMNG for non-payments in
Khabarovsk by giving it the right to export one million tons of West Siberian oil,
acquired under mandatory sales to the federal government, in Western Europe.)  Under
Russian law, it is illegal for energy suppliers to halt supply to government and strategic
consumers.
[Insert:  Natural Gas Balance]
How, then, should energy producers forecast revenues for a new energy pipeline?
According to Korchemkin, a new 1,400-km, 40 inch pipeline from Sakhalin to
Vladivostok, via Komsomolsk-na-Amure and Khabarovsk, would cost approximately
$2.2 billion.  The extension to South Korea and/or Harbin would add another one billion
to the cost.  If domestic consumers took 2.7 to 3.5 billion cubic meters either at
subsidized prices or in lieu of transit fees, then prices paid by foreign consumers would
have to be increased proportionately.
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Energy from Sakhalin faces competition from East Siberia.  A pipeline to China
from the Kovytinsk field in Irkutsk is currently expected to be highly competitive with
Sakhalin gas.  Each pipeline would need to access both the Chinese and South Korean
markets in order to reach an efficient scale of operation.
[Insert: RFE Domestic Natural Gas Scenario]
On economic, technological, and environmental grounds there is a strong case for
a rising share of natural gas use in Northeast Asia.  Elsewhere, the natural gas share of
world energy supply has increased from one-fifth to one-fourth over the past decade.
Japan, South Korea, and China account for almost one-quarter of the world’s population
but only 4 percent of world consumption of natural gas.
27  Between 1986 and 1997,
Northeast Asia’s total energy consumption grew at 5 percent per year.  Extrapolations
based on this past rate seem unrealistic in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, yet, even
at lower rates of increase, total energy demand in these three countries is likely to exceed
either US or the European Union’s energy consumption by 2010, accounting for more
than a quarter of world energy consumption.
Foreign Involvement in Sakhalin’s Energy
Development of Sakhalin’s offshore energy has moved ahead with Western
involvement because the Russian domestic industry had relatively little experience in an
Arctic offshore environment, because the Russian Federation government hoped to stem
the exodus of population from its gateway to the Pacific, and because the region’s fishing
and maritime industries feared that Russia’s domestic oil and gas producers would
damage the valuable Pacific fishery if they undertook development alone.  Western
multinational firms were willing to commit more than $1 billion, only after they received
authorization for production sharing, because they expected to have direct access to the
Pacific market without having to deal with Transneft, the national pipeline monopoly.
Both parties to Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 have adopted strategies to make
agreement possible and to protect themselves against “hold up.”  The Russian
government tendered the offshore fields in separate agreements.  It tried to assure that
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each project would have both an oil and a gas resource, which could be developed in
sequence.
The Western partners designed their production sharing agreements to provide a
steady flow of benefits to the local government in each period, even before production
began.  As cost escalation has threatened this goal, Western advisors and the Sakhalin
territorial administration are designing a Development Bank which would allow the
territory to borrow money to fund infrastructure projects, with repayment guaranteed by
future oil and gas revenues.
Investment is phased over time, so that the government must tradeoff the short-
run gain from expropriation against the long-run loss of future access to investment.
Although, with current high world oil prices, capital constraints have expanded.
Institutional barriers, which have been overcome in the case of oil extraction, will be
more difficult in the case of a large-scale natural gas pipeline.  Both Japanese and South
Korean energy companies express interest in a multilateral governmental agreement
providing investment guarantees.  (China, on the other hand, appears to want to negotiate
bilaterally with Russia.)
Under current plans, there are clear revenue-sharing rules for the division of
royalties, profits, and profit-oil between the federal and territorial governments.
However, in practice, the federal government uses its regulatory powers to impose in-
kind taxes on energy producers and to give certain energy users in-kind subsidies.  The
prohibition of export forces oil producers to sell at low domestic prices.  The obligatory
delivery of natural gas to non-paying users creates enormous in-kind taxes and subsidies.
Thus, the main risk to energy projects is not outright, but hidden, expropriation.
A survey of problems arising during implementation suggests that even relatively
minor issues, such as the procedure for disposal of drilling mud, can threaten a whole
project.  However, the main barrier that needs to be overcome, at least in the case of
natural gas, is the willingness of foreign partners to view Russia as a reliable long-term
supplier.  Until Russia overcomes these perceptions of high political and economic risk,
potential foreign partners will be reluctant to invest in the infrastructure to consume
Russian gas, and international capital markets will be reluctant to finance the pipelines to
deliver gas.29
In the long run, the Western policy agenda should include the possible
establishment of a multilateral mechanism providing investment guarantees for large,
multilateral projects.  However, in the short run, members of the Paris Club of creditors
will be quick to remind us that investment guarantees must be based on more than
wishful thinking.
All of Northeast Asia would benefit from a network of pipelines and ports linking
energy producers in Russia and elsewhere with consumers in Japan, Korea, and China.
Sakhalin is poised to play a catalytic role in initiating such cooperation, but, as always,
the devil is in the details.